

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

ACCESSION NO.

MGK 11-12302

DATE RECEIVED IN S. A.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
FBM	2056	7 July 49	JUL 8	In lnlm	copy detached
MMH				In lnlm	4-5: one of the wartime Labor
VH			JUL 8	HL	Desk's brightest stars enter
HTC		JUL 26	JUL 27	HL	the Pastime picture
RH				NA	→ Good
NW					For Kibitz file
EE/G				13 Dec 53	LAM
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT					Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)					Date: 2005
(2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/>					
(2)(B) Methods/Sources <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					
(2)(G) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/>					
RI/AR					WASH-CIA-PRO-805
1514					OSO Registry JUL 5 - 1949 5

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(1333)

22 Oct. 1951

[] never used for
Kibitz. Sought by OPC and
was considered by FOB because
of his unusual qualifications.
[]

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: _____
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO.: MGKA

9230

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CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 27 June 1949

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch "M"

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe *C/REG*

SUBJECT: GENERAL — Operational

SPECIFIC — Project (KIBITZ)
Ref: KARL 5076 WASH 5221

DOCUMENT NO. _____

CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒

CLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED TO: TS S C

DATE: 2/11

DATE: 7/7/81

REVIEWER: ()

1. [] was contacted on 18 June 1949 after approval from Washington had been secured for []'s possible use in connection with the KIBITZ scheme. [] is now [] Western Zones; the unification with the [] was effected on the very day of contact.

2. [] declared himself to be very eager to continue, or resume his cooperation with the Americans. His present contacts with the English authorities are limited to [] business; living now in the U.S. Zone, he is more "American oriented" than ever. In addition to his business contacts with English authorities evolving from his office, he has numerous friends among the English [] people, although the feeling of friendship has recently cooled off due to the dismantling policy of the Labor Government which is regarded as a hostile act by the German []. This latter fact is only apt to foster []'s favorable position in regard to the Americans whose policy in the dismantling and reparations questions has been greatly appreciated by the German [] — thus adding one more and very recent motive to []'s motivation for his cooperation with the Americans.

3. When the essential features of the project in question were presented to [] and the role which reliable [] operators could play in it, made clear to him, he declared his willingness to cooperate in the plan. It was pointed out to him that in case of war the [] would naturally be able to benefit from stay behind operators, as far as the maintaining of contacts with the homeland are concerned, much in the same way as [] kept his contacts from abroad with German [] people during the last war, only this time on a basis of better technical preparations and preparations made at the right time. But he was also told that the job in question was not meant to be primarily a [] job and that the stay behind operators would have to collect and relay all information of war importance. He agreed to that, pointing that during the last war his men in Germany had done this very thing. He also made clear that in case of war he would endeavor to leave Germany and that

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he would appreciate any means of contact with his men in Germany and every contribution they could possibly make to win the war.

4. [] was asked to select three men among the members of his [] who could serve as stay behind operators. These men, so he was told, should fulfill the following minimum requirements:

(a) They should be absolutely reliable, particularly in their attitude to Communism and Soviet Russia;

(b) They should not be too conspicuously anti-Russian so that the danger of their being eliminated by the Russians is kept to a minimum;

(c) They should be unfit for military or labor service for one of the following reasons: age, disablement, or war importance of job;

(d) Besides fulfilling the usual requirements for work as that in question (discretion, caution, etc.) they should have some understanding of the military and intelligence requirements involved in a stay behind operation;

(e) They should possibly have technical fitness for the job;

(f) They should be located in different regions of presumably strategic importance.

[] expressed his belief that he could find such men. As for the matter mentioned under (e), he doubted that he would be able to find full-fledged radio operators; he suggested looking among the [] telegraphists, i.e. among men who at least are versed in handling the Morse code - there, he believes, he will be able to find adequate prospects.

5. The following way of approach was suggested to [] and approved by him. After having found an adequate prospect, he should cautiously disclose to him the project in question, but at first exclusively under the [] angle, leaving out entirely the American part in it. Thus, if a prospect's reaction should be unfavorable and he should fall out of the scheme, he would not be informed about the U.S. hand in the plan. Only after a prospect's willingness to cooperate has been made reasonably sure, he should be told that the technical help of Americans has been secured, such as training and delivery of material. Thus, and gradually, could a prospect be let in the scope of the operation after he is found entirely suitable for the job. Upon notification, a prospect should be able to take as much leave from his job as is needed for training.

6. [] who in this matter was twice re-contacted on the evenings of 18 and 19 June 1949, is entirely won over for the project and will start immediately his search for adequate prospects. Results, however, cannot be expected immediately, not only due to the character of the project but also to the fact [] scheduled to take place in mid August 1949 and very busy until this date. During his election campaign which will require extensive travel in all of Western Germany, he will be on the look out for prospects.

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7. Possible costs involved in the project would mainly include refunding a prospect trainee for the salary lost during his training period. It was agreed with [] that no pay would be granted an operator but for the time of actual operations, i.e. principally in case of war or similar emergencies. It is obvious that for the maintenance of contact with [] some food and smoking allowance, as well as casual treatment of [] should be included in the costs of the project which may cause a subsequent upward revision of KIBITZ project.

Σ 50 H 1/15 J
Chief, KOB

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